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Introduction  
 
The last decade has brought about the rapid spread of information technology and 
social media. This development has had a large influence on Western societies as a whole 
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Abstract 
The internet has profoundly changed the way we communicate, including how jihadist 
groups seek to reach Western audiences with their propaganda strategies. Cases of believed 
online-radicalization call for a re-evaluation of radicalization processes, previously thought 
to depend on face-to-face interactions. Based on the Hoffman-Sageman debate on whether 
top-down or bottom-up processes drive terrorism, this essay explores both social movement 
and organizational approaches to understand online-radicalization. Do jihadist 
organizations such as Al-Qaeda and IS act as ‘fishermen’, actively engaging in the 
radicalization processes of individual recruits, or is radicalization driven by social group 
dynamics with little organizational involvement? Essentially, the larger question is: What 
role do organizational structures play for radicalization in times of ‘virtual jihad’? Bottom-
up radicalization processes are facilitated online, because the conditions for Sageman’s 
‘bunch of guys’ are replicated by the characteristics of virtual communication: an echo 
chamber effect causes frame-alignment through repetition and enables ‘digital natives’ to 
communicate claims that resonate with other ‘digital natives’. Top-down structures are 
influential, because organizations continue to employ sophisticated propaganda 
development, preachers and special recruiters or ‘fishermen’. The article finds evidence for 
both schools of thought and concludes that the internet facilitates both types of 
radicalization mechanisms. Only a holistic strategy will be successful in battling online-
radicalization and must include both targeting direct channels through which the 
organizations execute control over recruits, and breaking the echo chamber created by 
social movement dynamics in the virtual world. While countermeasures need to include the 
provision of alternative social narratives and the utilization of ‘digital natives’ to make 
counter-messages more effective, organizational structures need to be tackled 
simultaneously, not only by identifying and arresting preachers and recruiters, but also 
through stronger internet governance tools and collaboration with social media companies. 
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given that about 90% of Western populations are estimated to be able to connect to and use 
the internet (Sageman, 2008). Unsurprisingly, the internet not only transformed regular day-
to-day interactions, but extremist groups such as jihadists seek to use the new connectivity in 
the world for their purposes. While various studies on the content and organization of 
extremist groups in the online sphere have been published in recent years (Brandon, 2008; 
Musawi, 2010), processes of online-radicalization remain conceptually and practically 
elusive. This essay seeks to uncover certain mechanisms by which the internet facilitates the 
radicalization and recruitment processes into jihadist organizations. This is not to suggest that 
technological change has impacted religious extremism more than other forms of extremism 
(Wilkinson, 2016; Bartlett and Litter, 2011), but the popularity of the so-called Islamic State 
(hereafter IS) and related online content has made a discussion on jihadist online-
radicalization more acute than for other ideologies. Specifically, so-called ‘homegrown’ 
jihadists are believed to increasingly come in contact with jihadist ideology and groups online 
and pose a threat to Western societies. Arguably, “homegrown groups were responsible for 
78% of the jihadi terrorism plots in the West from 2003 to 2008” (King and Taylor, 2011, p. 
603) and have continued to pose a danger with the increased prominence of IS. This is 
especially true in the online sphere as “the internet has featured one way or another in each 
homegrown jihadi terrorist plot since 2002” (King and Taylor, 2011, p. 618). This makes a 
discussion on the features and processes of online-radicalization an important aspect of 
preventing and countering the spread of violent extremism. While there is ample discussion 
on the classification of attacks, such as distinguishing between directed and inspired attacks 
(Yourish, Watkins and Giratikanon, 2016), it is likely that whatever type of attack was carried 
out, some form of radicalization preceded the attack. This radicalization is increasingly 
believed to be influenced by social media content. Only by understanding how both extremist 
groups and individual users engage with propaganda supplied online and which factors 
facilitate online-radicalization, can effective measures be developed.  
The classical debate in sociology between structure and agency or the importance of 
organizations as opposed to individual socializations, is mirrored in terrorism studies by the 
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‘Hoffman-Sageman’ debate. While Hoffman (2006) postulates that the driving forces of 
extremism and terrorism are the organizational top-down structures of, for example, Al Qaeda 
and IS, Sageman (2004) identifies social group processes as facilitating extremism in a 
bottom-up manner. Based on these competing foci, this essay explores both bottom-up and 
top-down features of online-radicalization displayed by jihadist groups, ranging from the 
dissemination and discussion of propaganda without direct involvement of the group to active 
one-on-one recruitment. It is discussed to what extent recruitment efforts should be 
characterized as ‘fishermen’ actively seeking and engaging with potential recruits or as 
“jihobbyists” (Neumann, 2013, p. 435) relying on flat, non-hierarchical peer-group dynamics 
facilitated by the properties of social media to enable recruits to find them rather than vice 
versa. In other words, this essay is concerned with the relative importance and role of terrorist 
organizational structures in times of ‘virtual jihad’. The question whether agency lies with the 
group itself or individual members is likely to impact which responses to the growing concern 
about online-radicalization can expected to be effective. Even if IS is currently declining, 
learning how online-radicalization is approached in the context of jihadist groups, is 
beneficial to increase our knowledge on the phenomenon as a whole. In addition, applying 
and re-evaluating established theories to new developments can enhance our understanding of 
terrorist evolution and adaptation over time. 
Firstly, the reader is provided with relevant background information and definitions of 
concepts used throughout this work. Secondly, bottom-up and top-down features of online-
radicalization are discussed in turn and implications countermeasures are suggested. Lastly, a 
conclusion is provided. 
 
Methodology and Limitations 
 
The article employs secondary literature to assess the mechanisms of top-down and 
bottom-up radicalization processes in the online realm. It is a theoretical application of 
established theories supported by short examples. The aim of this work is not to explain 
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online-radicalization or resolve the controversy in the field around the issue. Rather, we seek 
to show that the current academic divide between those emphasizing Sageman’s line of 
thought and those adhering to Hoffman’s claims is artificial and that, in fact, both are at play 
in the virtual world. We present a system-level analysis rather than in-depth discussion of 
individual cases to show overall trends and processes at play regarding online-radicalization. 
A clear limitation of this as well as most other studies on online-radicalization is the 
lack of empirical data. Not only is online-radicalization a relatively new phenomenon, it is 
difficult to detect and analyze individuals radicalizing in the virtual world before they acted 
upon their violent ideology or became otherwise known to law enforcement personnel. While 
first-hand accounts, such as the blog of Jake Bilardi, exist sporadically, these writings must be 
used with caution. Firstly, an individual may not be aware of all the factors driving his or her 
radicalization processes and may therefore produce little more than clues for qualitative 
analyses. Secondly, retrospective testimonies may be impacted by more current thinking. For 
example, it is possible that an individual explains their radicalization with reference to a 
religious calling and subjectively believe that this was the driving force, whereas other factors 
such as isolation or the role of recruiters were present, but may be played down in their first-
hand account. It is generally very difficult to find or produce data for an analysis of online-
radicalization, which corresponds to academic standards. In addition, it needs to be stressed 
that radicalization is a phenomenon influenced by a multitude of factors, which differ in 
intensity and importance for each individual. It may be impossible to retrospectively prove 
whether online or offline, top-down or bottom-up or any other set of factors were decisive for 
radicalization processes. As noted before, current research is unable to prove a causation in 
radicalization studies and online-radicalization is not an exception in this respect. 
The lack of data, including the biased perceptions people may exhibit when giving 
first-hand accounts of their past, and the problem of unprovable causation are general 
problems of the field and it is unsurprising that they are also the main issues in discussing 
online radicalization. While the same limitations apply here as in the field of terrorism studies 
as a whole and caution must be exercised in judging the findings, the discussion below is of 
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value. While one may assign more importance to either bottom-up or top-down radicalization 
mechanisms in a specific case study, a better understanding of radicalization processes calls 
for the testing of both Sageman’s and Hoffman’s line of thought. Limiting oneself to only 
including top-down or bottom-up approaches may skew the overall findings. A holistic 
approach is likely to produce more nuanced results closer to real-life situations, in which both 
types of mechanisms are at play. While individual case studies may require certain 
adjustments, our system-level analysis presents a valuable tool for considering the multitude 
of factors at play in online-radicalization. 
 
Background 
 
The internet, defined as “including all communication, activity or content which takes 
place or is held on the world wide web (www) and cloud structures” (von Behr et al., 2013, p. 
2), has been used by violent groups since the very beginning of this technological 
advancement for various purposes. In the 1990s many groups established static websites, to 
produce and “make available alternative platforms, circumventing the mainstream media’s 
censorship, conveying unfiltered news, and disseminating ideological texts and materials” 
(Neumann, 2013, p. 434). At the same time, forums were launched, often by the groups 
themselves, which made discussions about controversial topics possible. These forums, 
however, were restricted in access and therefore hardly constituted a tool for wider 
radicalization and mobilization (Brandon, 2008). When broadband became widely available, 
the “dissemination of multimedia products, especially videos” revolutionised the propaganda, 
because it “spurred debates and generated constant excitement” (Neumann, 2013, p. 434). 
Increased availability and the opportunity to debate and negotiate ideological messages, rather 
than only reading about them, increases both exposure and perceived individual ownership of 
the ideas by those engaged in the discussion. With the rise of social networks and the 
emergence of user-generated content on platforms such as YouTube and Facebook, it became 
possible to reach an even wider audience and, as Neumann describes, it led to the possibility 
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of “people to virtually stumble into extremist propaganda” (Neumann, 2013, p. 435). For 
example, Roshonara Choudry was reportedly searching for more information about her 
religion and accidentally ‘stumbled upon’ sermons by Islamist preacher Anwar Al Awlaki. 
(Neumann, 2013). The development of the smartphone at the beginning of this decade 
increased the opportunities for extremist groups even more, with content now being available 
24/7 on devices carried around by people at all times. New secure apps like Telegram and 
Threema provide encryption and make a high, instant level of connection between groups and 
followers, as well as for followers with each other, possible (Burke, 2016, p. 16, p. 19). While 
terrorists engage in multiple activities online, including fund-raising or training (Rudner, 
2017, p. 11), the focus for this essay is placed on radicalization and recruitment activities 
only. 
Just like the term ‘terrorism’ in general (Schmid and Jongman, 2005; Weinberg, 
Pedahzur and Hirsch-Hoefler, 2004), ‘radicalization’ as a concept is contested and lacks both 
an accepted definition and agreement on its features and facilitating conditions. Various 
different theories and discussions on pathways of radicalization (e.g. Moghaddam, 2005; 
Venhaus, 2010; Wiktorowicz, 2005) and root causes (e.g. Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010) exist. 
These models fall on both sides of the Sageman-Hoffman debate and diverge significantly on 
the assumed influence, if any, and role of extremist organizations in radicalization. 
Specifically, the literature about online/internet-radicalization has mounted since the early 
2000s with governments becoming “increasingly aware of the importance of the internet in 
radicalization” and the topic becoming ever more popular among researchers (von Behr et al., 
2013, p. 3, p. 8). Academics come to very different conclusions regarding said importance, 
ranging from researchers sceptical of a significant role played by the internet in radicalization 
(Benson, 2014; Bouhana and Wikström, 2011) to researchers identifying the internet as a 
substantial and increasingly important facilitator (Berger and Strathearn, 2013; Carter, Maher 
and Neumann, 2014; Edwards and Gribbon, 2013; Neumann, 2012; McNicol, 2016). There is 
little agreement to be found what constitutes online-radicalization besides that the internet 
seems to provide a facilitating environment for radicalization (Meleagrou-Hitchens and 
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Kaderbhai, 2017) by providing space for effective and anonymous communication and better 
networking opportunities (Koehler, 2014). One of the main problems identified in the 
literature is the lack of a proven connection between “consumption of and networking around 
violent extremist online content and adoption of extremist ideology and/or engagement in 
violent extremism and terrorism” (Conway, 2017, p. 1). No causality has been proven 
between growing amounts of jihadist content on the internet (Weimann and Hoffman, 2006) 
and the radicalization of individuals online. At best a correlation is assumed (von Behr et al., 
2013, p. 17). However, the absence of evidence cannot be accepted as evidence of absence of 
a connection (argumentum ad ignorantiam). This essay is a contribution to the attempts to 
shed light on the elusive processes and features of possible online-radicalization.  
While the authors acknowledge the problem of lacking theoretical clarity and 
encourage further debate about the concept of online-radicalization, definitional disagreement 
should not prevent researchers and practitioners from engaging with the phenomenon of 
radicalization aided by online content. Especially since jihadists themselves display 
knowledge of the importance of online content. As Ayman al-Zawahiri, the current head of 
Al-Qaida, stated: “We [Al-Qaida] are in a battle, and more than half of this battle is taking 
place in the battlefield of the media. And that we are in a media battle in a race for the hearts 
and minds of our people” (Liebermann and Collins, 2008, p. 6). Therefore, the authors use a 
working definition for ‘homegrown’ online-radicalization until conceptual clarity can be 
achieved within the discipline. Borum defines radicalization as a process “by which people 
come to adopt [radical] beliefs that not only justify violence but compel it” (Borum, 2011, p. 
8) and the US Department of Justice specifically defines online-radicalization as a “process by 
which an individual is introduced to an ideological message and belief system that encourages 
movement from mainstream beliefs toward extreme views, primarily through the use of online 
media, including social networks such as Facebook, Twitter and Youtube” (U.S. Department 
of Justice, 2014). Taken together, online-radicalization may be described as the process of 
adopting beliefs justifying and/or compelling violence primarily through online media 
consumption. Radicalization is an individual process and may include different root causes, 
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pathways and elements for each individual. However, understanding broader processes, which 
potentially increase the susceptibility to adopting extremist ideologies in some individuals, 
may enhance both law enforcement and policy measures as well as further academic research 
with regards to extremism displayed online.  
Generally speaking, there have been two significantly different research approaches to 
understanding how the internet facilitates radicalization. Researchers either focus on the 
analysis of online content (Bhui and Ibrahim, 2013; Winter, 2015) or on the individuals 
consuming and using the online content (e.g. Edwards and Gribbon, 2013, p. 41; von Behr et 
al., 2013). This can be viewed parallel to the ‘Hoffman-Sageman’ debate (Sciolino and 
Schmitt, 2008), in which the role of an extremist organization is either active or passive 
during a person’s radicalization (King and Taylor, 2011, pp. 612–613). Historian Bruce 
Hoffman explains in his book Inside Terrorism (2006) that Al-Qaeda was significantly 
weakened following the wars and occupation in response to the 9/11 attacks, but that it was 
regaining strength and decision-makers should focus on eliminating the designated leadership 
of the organization to decrease the threat to the US posed by jihadist groups. To him, 
terroristic violence is primarily driven by organized groups with hierarchical structures, which 
engage in the preparation and execution of plots, from the radicalization of recruits to the 
planning of attacks. Psychologist Marc Sageman, however, disagreed that organizational 
channels are the largest driving force of terroristic danger to US national security and brought 
forward what is now commonly referred to as the ‘bunch of guys’ theory. Sageman postulates 
that radicalization is the result of small groups of friends, mostly young men, gradually 
engaging and then identifying themselves with extremist worldviews. Group dynamics and 
peer-pressure lead individuals to either drop out of the group or to adhere to the new shared 
worldview. To Sageman, radicalization is not a controlled or directed process to be traced 
back to ‘professional’ recruitment mechanisms, but the by-product of internal group 
dynamics. While the theory was originally designed to explain face-to-face processes of 
radicalization (Sageman, 2004), he later added the online dimension to his explanation and 
recognized the growing possibility of virtual ‘bunches of guys’ (Sageman, 2008). The 
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sometimes fiercely fought debate between the two academics (Scolino and Schmitt, 2008) 
ranged from controversies on methodology and data collection to the general question of what 
terrorism studies should focus on (Sageman and Hoffman, 2008; Hoffman, 2008). Yet, while 
on the surface the discussion revolved around Al-Qaeda and its methods specifically, it is 
symptomatic of broader disagreement on the underlying premises on radicalization and 
recruitment. It is, in essence, a disagreement about whether the spread of jihadism should be 
explained by means of organizational or social movement theory. Not only for Al-Qaeda, but 
for jihadist organizations in general, the question remains whether radicalization is mainly 
driven by top-down initiatives of actively ‘fishing’ recruits or bottom-up group dynamics with 
peer-groups acting like swarms by changing their ideological direction internally and in 
unison. The following sections explore both bottom-up and top-down radicalization and 
recruitment processes in the online realm to facilitate a more thorough understanding of the 
role of the internet in driving ‘homegrown’ extremism. 
 
Sageman: Passive Organizations - Active Peers 
 
Sageman’s theory postulates that that the threat of radicalization originates in small 
social groups or ‘bunches of guys’ inspired by and socializing each other into a certain 
worldview through internal group dynamics. Isolated individuals find each other and form 
friendship bonds, which can accelerate adopting radical ideas if one person brings these ideas 
into the close-knit peer-group for discussion. The group as a whole then seeks a link to a 
terrorist organization after their radicalization process. To Sageman, it is bottom-up social 
interactions and not the organizations themselves executing the most direct influence on 
radicalization processes (King and Taylor, 2011, p. 613). Essentially, the group one identifies 
with is able to drive a pathway to extremism more easily than organizational structures can, 
because, as Atran claimed “people don’t simply kill and die for a cause, they kill and die for 
each other” (Atran, 2010, p. ix). Terrorist organizations may follow a strategy, which includes 
enabling these social movement processes further, but are not actively engaged in top-down 
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recruitment. To resonate and achieve maximum legitimacy or impact, propaganda claims are 
adapted to the specific environment they are consumed in and tailored to specific audiences, 
both with regards to content discussed and the actors discussing the content, but the 
negotiation itself is undirected and self-driven by the users. Bottom-up online-radicalization is 
facilitated through macro-, meso- ands micro-level factors influencing the potential recruit, 
including the virtual environment, the content itself and the messenger conveying this content. 
Each are discussed in turn.  
 
The virtual social environment - the normalization of violence 
The internet constitutes a very specific environment for propaganda distribution. It 
makes little difference which jihadist group distributes the propaganda in this context, as “all 
justify violence to achieve the same end goal and share the same radicalization and 
recruitment techniques and strategies” (Gendron, 2017, p. 47). The internet has increased the 
effectiveness of distribution of jihadist propaganda decisively. In 2014, IS alone used to 
circulate three videos and 15 photographic reports per day while also producing monthly 
feature-length films, many of which are translated into English or subtitled (Winter, 2015, p. 
12). Increased visibility and accessibility through mainstream platforms such as Twitter 
enhances the potential reach of the propaganda messages and thereby widens the pool of 
potential recruits. The more people are exposed to the propagandistic material, the larger the 
chance that it resonates with someone. In addition to mainstream platforms, IS utilizes 
anonymous websites such as ‘justpaste.it’ and encrypted messaging apps such as Telegram 
(Milton, 2016, p. 41) to circumvent counter-measures by social media companies. Another 
output is the online magazines Rumiyah (previously Dabiq). These magazines are published 
in English and tailored to intrigue Western audiences (Ingram, 2017, p. 3, p. 10). 
Besides increasing visibility and reach by offering access to mainstream websites to 
spread propaganda, the internet has other properties, which facilitate bottom-up radicalization. 
Firstly, a seemingly infinite amount of propaganda material can be stored online and be 
accessed multiple times and at different points in time by potential recruits. People are not 
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required to be physically present anymore when an ideologue gives a speech, or to hide a 
propaganda leaflet, as content can be accessed and engaged with virtually without the 
limitations of time or space. It is no longer necessary to meet for prayer-groups or set up 
secret book shops, the place of conglomeration is now a ‘virtual town square’ (Neumann, 
2012). Secondly, real-time interactive services such as Whatsapp or other chat platforms 
enable communication between recruits in different countries and time-zones without any 
delay. Attacks or other current events can be discussed immediately and recruits are able to 
communicate with each other as if they sat in the same room. Group dynamics can evolve in 
the online realm and produce similar results as Sageman’s ‘bunch of guys’ dynamics in the 
offline world, because instant communication enables deep relations and peer mechanisms to 
arise online. In short, the internet has helped jihadist organizations overcome the constraints 
of time and space and allows peer-group dynamics to emerge virtually. 
Additionally, social media platforms create so-called ‘echo chambers’ (Winter, 2016, 
p.17) or ‘virtual bubbles’ (Musawi, 2010, p. 18). Similar to sound being reflected in a cave, 
social media platforms show users only what they and their network ‘liked’ or ‘followed’ 
without outside content ever penetrating these ideological bubbles. Comparable to Sageman’s 
peer groups, which create a “collective identity and foster solidarity, trust, community, 
political inclusion, identity formation, and other valuable social outcomes” (Sageman, 2004, 
p. 157), social networks within the same echo chamber facilitate a sense of commonality and 
belonging by only displaying specific ideological narratives. If seemingly everyone around 
oneself displays similar views, one may be more inclined to accept these as true and adhere to 
them as well. Through constant repetition or ‘echoing’ within the social network, a 
normalization of violence and other components of the propaganda takes place. Normalization 
through repetition (Neumann, 2012) facilitates the acceptance of the messages conveyed by 
the peers in the echo chamber and may, over time, help to radicalize an individual. If radical 
views are not only accepted, but actively facilitated by a peer group online, its members may 
construct their worldview in accordance. Neumann describes that: “As a result, people acquire 
a skewed sense of reality so that extremist attitudes and violence are no longer taboos but – 
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rather - are seen as positive and desirable” (Neumann, 2013, p. 436). In essence, the echo 
chamber facilitates ‘groupthink’ processes by which members can radicalize collectively 
without an outside force driving the process. The discussion and gradual acceptance of 
propaganda claims creates a shared ingroup identity and triggers a self-reinforcing dynamic 
by making the consumer believe that everybody around them adheres to ideological 
worldview propagated. This can create a powerful group dynamic of constantly engaging with 
and thereby normalizing the propaganda claims or, as Ingram calls it, “cyclical cognitive 
reinforcement” processes (Ingram, 2017, p. 5).  
The internet facilitates bottom-up online-radicalization by allowing jihadist groups to 
overcome the constraints of time and space and by facilitating a one-sided display of 
information resulting in a greater acceptance of propaganda claims repeated and normalized 
by ‘virtual bubbles’. Constant exposure to ideological narratives may create greater 
susceptibility to radialization and increase the chances of accepting the propaganda frames as 
one’s own worldview. Complementing this, the content of the messages disseminated on the 
internet also facilitates bottom-up radicalization processes. 
  
Propaganda and online content - frames that resonate 
The content of jihadist propaganda and its effect may be analyzed by using Quintan 
Wiktorowicz’s framing theory. A frame is defined as “an individual’s worldview, consisting 
of values (notions about right and wrong) and beliefs (assumptions about the world, attributes 
of things, and mechanisms of causation)” (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010, p. 801). Framing theory 
explains violent radicalization “[…] through the distinct constructed reality, into which 
members of violent groups are socialised – a constructed reality or worldview” (Dalgaard-
Nielsen, 2010, p. 802). In other words, individuals come to accept the claims made and 
normalized by their echo chambers as their own and construct their worldview in accordance 
with them. Wiktorowicz used to claim that online content by itself will never be enough to 
fully frame an issue, as the media is a powerful vehicle for agenda setting and “movements 
utilize media coverage as a mechanism to facilitate message dissemination to a broader 
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audience” (Wiktorowicz, 2005, p. 98). A decade later, however, jihadists do not rely on 
Western media coverage to the same extent as they used to. The internet enables them to set 
their own agenda and disseminate their ideology without it being filtered by journalists acting 
as middle-men. The aim of the propaganda of jihadist groups is to increase both visibility and 
acceptance of their claims. This leads the potential recruits, who regularly consume the 
pictures and videos, to construct a worldview, in which it is the highest purpose for every 
Muslim to defend victimized members of the global community of Muslims, the ummah. As 
Ingram puts it: “Inspire and Dabiq’s narratives are designed to provide their audiences with a 
competitive system of meaning that coaxes their audience to use it as the ‘lens’ through which 
to perceive the world and process decisions” (Ingram, 2017, p. 3).  
Content may be classified using the six themes of the IS ‘brand’ by Charlie Winter. 
Brutality serves as gratification to the supporters and provokes outrage from the international 
media (Winter, 2015, pp. 22–23), helping the recruitment process by increasing the visibility 
and recognition of the brand. The topic of brutality in the propaganda can also lead to 
‘mortality salience,’ “an overpowering sense of one’s own mortality, which increases support 
for suicide operations and other, often excessively brutal, terrorist tactics” through “constant 
exposure to discourses about martyrdom and death” (Neumann, 2012, p.17-18) according to 
Tom Pyszczynski. Mercy, which is aimed at local populations, and Victimhood draw the 
attention of consumers to the deprivation of the local populations in majority Muslim 
countries suffering from Western attacks. Watching these videos is a motivational factor in 
many case studies (e.g. Kirby, 2007, p. 418), and while videos on this topic existed before the 
internet, being circulated on tapes or CDs, the scale and accessibility of material on the 
internet is unmatched. Propaganda is available 24/7 on the internet and the victimhood motive 
can induce a sustained sense of moral outrage, an important trigger for violent actions taken 
by extremists (Sageman, 2008). For example, Arid Uka, who attacked US soldiers at 
Frankfurt airport in 2011, spend much of his time online due to a lack of real-life contacts. On 
one of the websites, he saw a video containing images of US soldiers allegedly raping a 
Muslim woman. This created sustained outrage over the victimization of one of his fellow 
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Muslims that he decided to take action the next day (Frankfurter Neue Presse, 2012). To act 
on behalf of one’s ingroup and to stop the victimization of peers can be a strong pull factor 
and may give the individual the feeling of purpose and the opportunity to end evil treatment 
of those he/she identifies with. The echo chamber constantly reminds its members that 
Muslims qua Muslims are attacked and that only counter-violence can address this issue 
adequately. The topic of War fulfils two purposes with regards to recruitment, it builds the 
narrative of IS being a ‘real state’ with a real army, while also appealing to consumers seeking 
adventure or a thrill (also see Venhaus, 2010). Belonging, a strong motivational factor 
according to Sageman, is used by the propagandists showing strong comradery; IS is 
acknowledging “that offers of friendship, security and a sense of belonging are powerful 
draws for its supporters abroad“ (Winter, 2015, pp. 27–28). The last topic identified by 
Winter is Utopianism, the aspiration of constructing a better and safer world for the global 
community of Muslims, which adds an end-goal to the jihadist narrative and portrays a future 
worth fighting for. While this existed before, the internet enables visualizations of said utopia, 
which can make it a more tangible objective for consumers. 
In summary, the potential recruit is confronted with constant reminders that Muslims 
are under attack and that young men need to take up arms in order to fulfill the utopian vision 
of an Islamic State. This corresponds to the classical scheme of framing identified by Benford 
and Snow (2000). To them, in order to resonate, narratives need to include a diagnostic 
element of what the problem is, a prognostic element envisioning a better future and a 
motivational element calling for action. While the direction of propaganda is set by the 
organizational structures and media outlets, the content and themes are discussed, negotiated 
and disseminated in the ‘echo chambers’. It is not enough to passively consume propaganda 
content, the social interaction about this content is what drives radicalization. Members are 
constantly reminded of the six important narratives aimed at causing an emotional reaction in 
the recruit and their peers in the network express their support for the claims, which may lead 
an individual to accept them as true and right. 
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The internet adds another structural element to the dissemination of propaganda, 
which facilitates bottom-up radicalization processes: egalitarian interactivity. Online, no pre-
made hierarchy exists and every user can not only consume, but actively engage in 
discussions about their ideology and the frames constructed or even produce content 
themselves. Rather than simply coming to align one’s own worldview to that displayed by 
peers in the echo chamber, the internet enables recruits to engage in the direct development of 
frames. Not only ‘frame alignment’ (Wiktorowicz, 2005), but frame construction can take 
place when potential recruits access discussion forums, negotiate and re-negotiate the jihadist 
narrative presented to them. For example, the so-called ‘Virginia Five’, a group of friends in 
the US, produced videos with extremist content and then distributed them throughout different 
forums and popular platforms such as YouTube (Neumann, 2012). They influenced the 
narrative by adding content independently of organizational guidance. This interactivity and 
the potential inclusion of all voices can make consumers of propaganda feel more involved in 
the virtual group dynamics and increase perceived ownership of the worldview brought 
forward. In an inclusive, interactive process, framing activities themselves, not only the 
resulting frames, facilitate the recruit’s identification with the group and increases the 
resonance of the messages spread. It is of secondary importance whether bottom-up processes 
actually change the content of propaganda narratives as a perceived influence already 
increases emotional ownership of the frames and increases their resonance. Resonance may 
also be increased through familiar communication patterns displayed by those, who represent 
a peer group to the potential recruit, which is discussed below. 
 
Utilizing digital natives- the importance of the messenger 
Not only the environment in which the propaganda is conceived and the content itself 
are important for the resonance of the claims made. Those conveying the message and their 
characteristics also influence the perceived legitimacy of the claims and their effect on the 
consumers of propaganda. Whether one identifies with a certain group online depends on the 
content of the frames communicated and the environment they are communicated in, but to 
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increase perceived belonging and ultimately achieve that individuals construct their identity 
based on this group, the messenger plays an important role too. Generally, we are more 
inclined to trust those similar to ourselves (Ben-Ner and Kramer, 2006) and especially young 
people are reported to display more trust (Durante, 2011) and positive feelings in online 
interactions (Page, DK and Mapstone, 2010) than older generations do. Sageman even writes 
that “online feelings are stronger in almost every measure than offline feelings” (Sageman, 
2008, p.114). One explanation for increased resonance may therefore be found in the 
familiarity of interactions of so-called ‘digital natives’ (Prensky, 2001a) in the virtual world 
and the effect this has on the perceived belonging and identity construction of the potential 
recruits. The term ‘digital native’ was coined by Prensky (Prensky, 2001a) and refers to a 
person actively using modern communication technologies throughout their upbringing, who 
therefore communicates and processes information differently than ‘digital immigrants’ 
(Prensky, 2001b) who were not socialized using these technologies from an early age.  
 Many potential recruits to terrorist groups are young males between 15 and 30 who, if 
they grew up in the Western world, are likely to be digital natives due to the spread of internet 
and social media usage in the last two decades. In the online realm, digital natives are able to 
intuitively navigate their surroundings and, due to their shared socialization characteristics, 
are likely to share communication patterns with other digital natives. Familiarity in 
communication makes it easier for digital natives to relate to each other as the framing of an 
issue influences its resonance with the target audience. In other words, because digital natives 
share an intuitive way of communicating, messages from digital natives, their choice of words 
or metaphors, ‘speaks to’ and resonates with other digital natives. The numerous young 
foreign fighters and others engaged in the dissemination of jihadist propaganda can increase a 
person’s susceptibility to radicalization due to their ability to convey the frames in a relatable 
manner. Additionally, those engaging in the spread of propaganda in their native tongue, such 
as Pierre Vogel in Germany, add another layer of familiarity to their claims and make them 
resonate even more with their audiences. Sharing social dispositions with the messengers 
increases the familiarity of messaging and therefore the trust in those similar to the potential 
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recruits. This makes identification both with the claims and the conveyors of the propaganda 
more likely and can result in the evolution of virtual ‘imagined communities’ (Anderson, 
1991).  
Sageman’s ‘bunch of guys’ (2004) replicates itself in the online sphere as young 
people connect to, discuss and identify themselves with extremists and their narrative. The 
possibility of finding communities online, which have the same ideas and mindset as the 
individual searching, leads to less social control of their offline environment such as family or 
educational facilities, which could otherwise act as a counter-force to radicalization. Increased 
interactions online and an increased emotional connection with people who are perceived to 
be the same as oneself can diminish the influence of offline social networks considerably. The 
radical views are facilitated and enforced by like-minded peer communities found online. 
Before the internet, individuals with radical ideas may not have found others in their offline 
world to share and discuss these views with, or even to have the ideas in the first place. It lies 
in the nature of the internet to connect people across distance and even time, hence potential 
recruits and seekers with no offline connection to radical groups can link up with terrorist 
structures online, making the theoretical phenomenon of self-starting groups possible 
(Sageman, 2009, pp. 4–25).  
Bottom-up radicalization processes in the online sphere are facilitated by the specific 
properties of the internet such as the echo chamber, by the way ideological frames and 
narratives are discussed and by the way digital natives are able to relate to each other in the 
virtual sphere. However, while the evidence for bottom-up processes driving online-
radicalization is compelling, one should not dismiss the possibility that a certain degree of 
strategic steering from jihadist organizations is involved and impacts the process. Therefore, 
we now turn to examine Hoffman’s claim that top-down dynamics explain the spread of 
jihadist extremism in the online environment.   
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Hoffman: Active Organizations 
 
On the other side of the debate are those siding with Hoffman (2006), who argues that 
the jihadist organizations maintain strong operational and strategic control over the 
individuals who choose to engage in terrorism (King and Taylor, 2011, p. 613). Hoffman 
postulates that terroristic violence is driven in a top-down manner with hierarchical 
organizations managing every aspect of the process leading up to an attack. Members of the 
organizations have designated roles, some of which entail the identification, selection, 
radicalization and recruitment of new members to the cause. This is done increasingly through 
online communication. Thompson writes: “Al-Qaida and its affiliates understand the Western 
world’s reliance on information sharing and use of technology to communicate. They are 
increasingly using the Internet to manipulate the grievances of alienated youth, radicalize 
them, and give them a sense of purpose” (Thompson, 2012, p.168). Again, one can identify 
macro-, meso- and micro-level processes facilitating top-down online-radicalization; namely 
content management and distribution, the use of preachers and the role of recruiters. Each are 
discussed in turn. 
  
Content management and distribution 
  Today, jihadist organizations, notably IS, have a sophisticated propaganda 
development department and designated ‘staff’ dealing with this issue specifically. The IS 
media branches include the Ajnad Media Foundation, Al-I’tisam, Al-Hayat, Makateb al-
Vilayat, Al-Bayan radio station (Sardarnia and Safizadeh, 2017, p.8), the online magazine 
Dabiq (now named Rumiyah) and Bonyad Zora, which is specifically aimed at a female 
audience (Sardarnia and Safizadeh, 2017). Milton showed that the IS media outlets form a 
carefully planned semi-hierarchical structure in the shape of a pyramid, producing propaganda 
in multiple languages and tailored to different regional contexts (Milton, 2016). In addition to 
official websites, IS utilizes a variety of mainstream websites to distribute content produced 
by its propaganda departments. The platform Telegram has arguably become one of the most 
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important ways of communicating ideological content to followers. Telegram offers secure, 
encrypted messaging in chats users must be invited to before they can access content, which 
often means that an invitation link is posted on other social media platforms such as twitter 
and then removed again after a short period of time. Designated administrators control the 
dissemination of the links and the access to the chats, including removing individual users 
they deem suspicious (Bloom et al., 2017). These administrators are believed to be official 
propagandists, whose specific role within the organization consists of social media content 
management. An indication for the tight control exercised by the organization over the 
content on Telegram is that the administrators are believed to use bots to post content in 
hundreds of chats simultaneously (Bloom et al., 2017). There is clear centralization evident in 
the structure of the media branches as well as the production and distribution of IS 
propaganda. 
The sheer sophistication of the propaganda development and distribution is an 
indication that radicalization is partially driven by top-down processes, as a lot of the content 
used for the purpose of radicalization is produced by ‘official’ media arms of the 
organizations. Having specialized media branches ensures the continued production of 
propaganda material, which can then be distributed widely through social networks. The age 
of social media requires continuous posting of new material to keep users interested and this 
is assured through the specialization of certain members on the production of content. 
Specialization also enables more sophisticated and diverse propaganda production than small, 
disconnected cells could produce by themselves. IS, for example, distributes movie-style 
videos in multiple languages and even online games. 
Semi-hierarchical distribution and centralization of propaganda production also 
ensures coherence in the message. As we have seen earlier, IS exploits various themes for 
their propaganda communication, which are aimed at causing an emotional reaction in the 
consumer. The coherence of the message necessary to develop a holistic ideological claim, 
which resonates with users, is strengthened through the use of official media outlets. 
Inconsistencies are avoided through content management from the organization itself and the 
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themes used are employed deliberately and not by chance. This does not mean that individual 
users do not produce content themselves, especially when commenting and discussing, but 
official messages display coherency, which may increase their resonance and perceived 
legitimacy. Another advantage of the internet in preserving the coherence of the message is 
that online communication cuts out the middlemen previously involved in communication 
processes. Mainstream journalists, who may not report the full story or a convey biased view 
to their readers or listeners, are not needed anymore to provide possible recruits with 
information about the movement. A link to the organization is literally a ‘click’ away today, 
and one is able to access ‘official’ content from the organization itself. However, it needs to 
be stated that mainly passive consumption of jihadist propaganda may not be enough for a 
radicalization process to unfold. There are individuals, whose specific role is not only the 
production of content, but the engagement with followers and therefore the direct execution of 
top-down radicalization processes. 
  
Preachers – accessible authority figures 
  Preachers produce content in line with the ideology of their affiliated organization and 
present a hybrid between propagandists and recruiters. The material produced by them stays 
online or can continuously be re-uploaded if detected by security forces and influence 
multiple generations of recruits. Arguably the most prominent online preacher was Anwar al-
Awlaki, an American-born individual who “utilized the Internet to purvey Al Qaeda’s militant 
Islamist doctrine to a targeted audience of educated, English-speaking Muslim youth” 
(Rudner, 2017, p. 13). For example, the Canadian group ‘Toronto 18’ had planned multiple 
attacks throughout Ontario in 2006 after watching extensive content posted by al-Awlaki 
(Gendron, 2017). Despite his death in 2011, al-Awlaki continues to influence the jihadist 
seekers with his material online, and his work is among the most frequently downloaded 
jihadist material. Gendron observes: “Many of those who have been apprehended in the last 
few years and charged with terrorist offenses in the West, as well as those who have 
volunteered to fight abroad, are known to have accessed Awlaki’s online sermons” (Gendron, 
2017, p. 49). The constant availability and storing of content does not only mean preachers 
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can continue their influence post-mortem, but it also makes it easier for living preachers to 
cover a wide array of themes since previous talks are always available to the followers. This 
increases the breadth of the themes discussed. If unable to store content, preachers would 
have to constantly repeat the key points to potential new followers to ensure that the most 
important claims reach their followers. The internet frees them of this constraint and enables 
deeper and wider discussion of propaganda claims by preachers, which results in a more well-
rounded ideological communication. Everyday topics can now be elaborated upon, whereas 
previously pure ideological claims would have taken precedent due to the constraints of 
availability. This, in turn, makes it easier to relate to the messages propagated and may 
increase resonance within the followers. 
  The content produced and uploaded can then be used by recruiters. Because preachers 
represent a moral and religious authority, recruiters can refer to the sermons they produce in 
order to validate their recruitment claims. Preachers, however, also contact and make 
themselves available to their followers, influencing the recruitment process directly. Using the 
internet has several advantages. The preachers can stay in touch and direct control with their 
followers, thus they are able to respond to questions and counter arguments in real time. It 
allows them “to keep a finger on the pulse,” (Gendron, 2017, p. 56) checking the topics of 
conversations and feeling the mood in the community, to which they can adjust their sermons 
accordingly and thereby achieve more effective resonance. Similar to the group processes 
discussed in relation to Sageman, real-time interaction is a key factor in communicating with 
potential recruits. Here, however, the communication and discussion are steered by an 
authority figure and cannot be characterized as peer processes. The medium through which 
the communication unfolds remains the same, but the communicating parties and therefore the 
communication mechanism differs from what we saw earlier. The internet enables top-down 
radicalization, because it enables preachers to distribute their content widely and to engage in 
communication with their followers directly. This property of the internet also enables the so-
called ‘after-sales service’, which permits preachers to “identify the committed from the 
merely curious and facilitate their transition to militant activism” (Gendron, 2017, p. 57) by 
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which preachers also partially act as recruiting agents. This is a clear indication that top-down 
recruitment processes take place in the online realm. Preachers, in their dual purpose of 
propagandists and active facilitators of communication and ultimately recruitment, use the 
internet to their advantage. Online platforms allow for increased availability, but also for 
preachers to communicate with the consumers of their content directly and to identify 
‘promising’ candidates for recruitment into their affiliated organization. 
  
Recruiters – the fishermen 
  While some researchers postulate that face-to-face interaction is necessary for 
recruitment to occur, other academics maintain the notion that, without having sound data to 
the contrary, there is a possibility that recruitment processes can take place fully online now 
(Conway, 2017, p. 81). Most research arguing that a face-to-face connection must occur stems 
from a time when the rise of social media had not yet changed and democratized the 
communication processes online. With digital natives (Prensky, 2001a) being used to having 
relationships purely within the online realm, a change in recruitment procedures emerged 
concurrently. An example are the 2016 attacks in Germany, where the attackers were in 
contact with IS members on instant messaging apps before and during the attack, with no 
record of offline-radicalization activities or face-to-face meetings having taken place 
(Joscelyn, 2016). In both the Ansbach and Würzburg attacks, the perpetrators were in constant 
contact with IS operatives before and even during the attack (Ulrich, 2016), which suggests a 
high level of organizational control. 
  Even if part of the radicalization process takes place offline, the internet has 
considerable advantages for recruitment purposes. Recruiters can act as ‘fishermen’ and can 
use the internet to identify individuals susceptible to radical ideas more easily. In a RAND 
study from 2013, a recruiter described the internet as a widening pool of potential recruits: 
“The internet is like a fishing net, catching surface fish, not bottom fish. We used to catch one 
at a time, now we catch 100-200 in a year” (von Behr et al., 2013, p. 26). Approaching 
potential recruits is also less risky for the recruiter online than offline (Neumann, 2013, p. 
437). To find and approach potential recruits, recruiters “monitor online communities where 
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they believe they can find receptive individuals, but they also make themselves highly 
available to curious seekers” (Berger, 2015, p. 20). Recruiters can engage in ‘reconnaissance’ 
of their targets prior to approaching them, which increases the likelihood of success and 
decreases the risk of approaching someone, who will then report the recruiter to authorities. 
After the primary interest expressed through visits to those sites “local talent spotters” take 
over and “recruiters prep […] the potential recruits for enlistment” (Rudner, 2017, p. 15). As 
Charlie Winter states: without engagement online “the [offline] recruiter’s job would have to 
be based solely on rhetoric and chance. With it, they are able to quickly address doubts with 
ready-made visual and audio arguments” (Winter, 2015, p. 35). Recruitment efforts can be 
tailored to individual needs and facilitated through private conversations once the potential 
recruit has been identified. This, again, increases the chances of success for the recruiter. One 
can observe this type of behavior in the case of Colleen LaRose, also known as JihadJane, 
who was identified and approached by several Al Qaeda associates seeking to influence her to 
kill a Swedish cartoonist publishing images of the Prophet Mohammed. She had little to none 
Muslim contacts in the real world and engaged with her faith and the extremist propaganda 
solely online (Neumann, 2012; Halverson and Way, 2012). After declaring her wish to 
become a martyr, she was contacted directly by Al Qaeda ‘staff’, a clear indication of 
organizational recruitment. 
  Another option is that individuals who, for whatever reason, came into contact with 
radical material online, reach out to the recruiters directly. Recruiters are well-connected 
individuals - both online and offline - and act as a bridge into an organization. In online 
networks, recruiters are simultaneously ‘hubs’ and ‘brokers’. Hubs are individuals with many 
connections, who can receive and distribute information to a large number of otherwise 
unconnected people. Brokers are individuals bridging two otherwise disconnected networks, 
in this case the terrorist organization on the one side and the pool of potential recruits on the 
other side. Being a hub has two advantages for recruiters. Firstly, they are easy to find for 
newcomers in the network, because they are known by so many people and new members are 
referred to them. Network theory assumes social networks to develop according to 
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‘preferential attachment’; that is, new individuals in the network will most likely attach 
themselves to those who already have the most connections. Recruiters are therefore easy to 
be found and accessed. Secondly, recruiters who are hubs have the ability to distribute 
messages effectively. Thompson writes: “The average person with a worthwhile message or 
cause can send it to a high-profile individual with a large social media following, and that 
individual may forward the message to his or her followers, immediately bringing the 
message or cause to the attention of millions of people” (Thompson, 2012, p.176). The 
connections of the hub will then share the message with their own network of friends and a 
cascade of information distribution follows. Recruiters are therefore a valuable tool for 
organizations, because they both attract and identify new followers and simultaneously 
maintain a large network of connections to distribute information effectively and widely. 
  The internet facilitates top-down radicalization processes by providing jihadist 
organizations with a global platform, which makes it possible to reach individuals everywhere 
and at any point in time. Organizations display a sophisticated propaganda production 
machinery ensuring the continued creation of ideological content and the coherence of the 
message. Organizations utilize preachers and recruiters in the online realm not only to 
distribute their propaganda widely, but to actively identify, radicalize and recruit potential 
new members into the organization. 
 
Implications 
 
Government spending and the allocation of resources is influenced by the role a 
government assigns to organizations or social movement structures. Disrupting social 
networks may require the action of different departments than catching designated leaders of 
terrorist organizations and therefore a competition for resources is likely to erupt. This 
analysis has shown that both mechanisms have an influence and that it is indeed likely that 
radicalization is facilitate by both bottom-up and top-down processes. Both are valuable to 
advance terroristic violence and therefore a blended, holistic countermeasures approach 
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including governments, law enforcement and civil actors is required. The Hoffman-Sageman 
debate has been symptomatic of a dangerous either-or mentality, which may cloud our 
understanding of the complex nature of radicalization processes. The internet has enabled 
social movement dynamics with a global reach and facilitated the building of virtual 
‘imagined communities’ (Anderson, 1991) based on familiarity and trust, but the production 
of propaganda and the use of active recruiters are still directed by organizational structures. 
The coherence of messaging is ensured and propaganda is produced based on the thematic 
foci of framing used to inspire action in social movements (Benford and Snow, 2000). The 
internet helped salafi-jihadism to become an idea transcending individual organizations, 
softened previously established hierarchies in organizations and enabled flexible membership 
and participation, but has not made real-world organizational structures obsolete.  
 In order to be effective, countermeasures need to adhere to the changed role of 
organizations and address social movement processes without losing track of the directed 
organizational measures of terrorist organizations. To counter social movement processes, the 
construction of alternative narratives (not only counter-narratives) is necessary to help 
facilitate the feeling of belonging to mainstream society. There can and should be the 
promotion of democratic values to counter fundamentalist ideologies, but it is not enough to 
counter ideology. People need to feel like they belong to society and are accepted. Social 
relations are an important part of what drives some individuals into extremism and for this 
reason, it is beneficial to involve civil society actors in CVE measures, both in the real world 
and the online realm. In the real world, reputable actors may encourage open debate on what 
it means to be a Muslim in a Western democracy, but also provide spaces for positive group 
dynamics to develop, for example by encouraging mixed-background sports teams. In 
addition, providing legitimate and effective, but non-violent outlets for grievances and 
inclusion in political processes can decrease susceptibility to violent actions. In the online 
realm, empowering the voices of digital natives and utilizing their ability to intuitively 
connect with other digital natives can help create more effective countermeasures in terms of 
form, content and delivery. Examples for this already exists, such as the YouthCan initiative 
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(YouthCan, 2017) and should continue to be supported. However, organizational structures 
should not be ignored. Progress needs to be made on international regulations for internet 
governance and more cooperation with social media platform providers to make extremist 
content harder to distribute and decrease the chances of ‘stumbling upon’ it while using 
regular websites. Law enforcement needs the necessary tools to investigate, arrest and punish 
preachers and recruiters and transnational cooperation on this issue is of utmost importance. 
Organizations use the internet, because it increases their reach and makes access to global 
recruits easier. In limiting their reach and access, we may be able to effectively decrease the 
importance of the internet for facilitating violent extremism. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This study found evidence for both schools of thought: The internet helps to facilitate 
radicalization, both through enabling bottom-up and top-down processes; it essentially 
empowers organizations and social movement dynamics alike. Bottom-up processes are 
facilitated through the creation of echo chambers, which constantly repeat and thereby 
normalize violent narratives. The content is specifically tailored to arouse emotions and is 
continuously debated by internet users, which facilitates perceived ownership and legitimacy 
of the claims made. Digital natives are able to frame violent narratives in familiar terms for 
other digital natives and thereby increase the resonance of the claims within their peer groups. 
Overall, the internet helps connect potential recruits with like-minded individuals facilitating 
networks of trust or ‘imagined communities’ (Anderson, 1991), which facilitate the adoption 
of shared radical frames.  
On the other side of the debate, the internet empowers organizations to increase their 
reach and effectiveness in spreading propaganda. Organizations are able to control the 
development and dissemination of content through their social media branches and the use of 
specialized ‘staff’ as content managers on websites used for radicalization purposes. The 
coherence of the message decreases the risk of frictions and may increase resonance within 
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recruits. Preachers and recruiters can reach more individuals across the world through direct 
online communications and better tailor their recruitment messages. Recruiters are 
simultaneously hubs and brokers in their networks and can effectively identify and ‘fish’ new 
recruits. 
Although it is still unclear whether individuals can radicalize solely online, much of 
the evidence points in the direction of an increasing importance of online jihadist activity in 
recruitment, whether through passive means as implied by Sageman or active means as 
proposed by Hoffman. It is likely that jihadist groups use a mix of the two strategies; there is 
evidence for both approaches and governments should seek to counteract both sets of 
processes. Jihadist organizations have not necessarily lost their influence, but are aided and 
complimented by the virtual social movement characteristics the internet provides them with. 
Organizations continue to produce and disseminate propaganda, but this propaganda is then 
‘digested’ by the followers by means of group dynamics facilitating bottom-up recruitment. 
Any comprehensive and effective counter-terrorism policy needs to counter both dynamics. 
Next to improvements in the sphere of internet governance, cooperating with social media 
providers and empowering law enforcement personnel to utilize the online data available to 
crack down real-world cells, soft-power mechanisms such as an inclusion of digital natives in 
the construction of alternative and counter-narratives can be beneficial. 
More research is needed to understand the exact processes of online-radicalization and 
whether or not radicalization can take place purely through online engagement and 
interactions. In addition, scholars need to investigate and negotiate the meaning of 
membership of an extremist organization in times of ‘virtual jihad’. Is it enough to consume 
online content, or post comments, or disseminate propaganda to be called a supporter or even 
part of a terrorist network? Conceptual clarity on membership in times of clicktivism and 
fluid social networks in the online realm, may help direct both research and law enforcement 
to address consumers, disseminators and those actively engaging in propaganda negotiation in 
appropriate ways. This research has shown that while the internet has enabled bottom-up 
social movement processes to take place virtually by connecting supporters on a global scale, 
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terrorist organizational structures are far from obsolete. Salafi-jihadism spreads through social 
movements and friend-groups, but groups and hierarchies drive action in the real world, albeit 
building on and using the community of supporters in the virtual world. Both mechanisms, 
bottom-up and top-down, need to continue to be the focus of countermeasures and academic 
research as they complement each other to create powerful structures composed of both fluid 
networks and hierarchical structures. 
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